Under Michigan’s Adoption Code, MCL 710.21 to 710.70,
adoption of a child by a stepparent under the does not terminate a grandparent’s
right to commence an action for grandparenting time with a child. In Warren v
Brown (a paternity case), maternal grandparents sought grandparenting time after
their daughter died. The facts are pretty convoluted: The child was conceived out of wedlock and the mother,
Warren, separated from Brown. The mother became involved with Wright. She had a terminal
illness, and married Wright the day before she died when the child was 9 months
old. The mother named Wright in her will as the child’s guardian and he then
became the child’s sole caregiver. As the child’s sole caregiver and guardian, Wright
remarried 3 years later. As the child’s sole caregiver and guardian, Wright
remarried 3 years later. Wright and his wife became joint guardians. After a year
of marriage, they commenced and completed a guardianship
adoption.
When, after the adoption, the Wrights limited visitation between the child
and members of Warren’s family, the grandparents filed a petition for
grandparenting time. The petition was opposed by an affidavit from the Wrights
stating that as two fit parents, they opposed the visitation. The Warrens
countered by stating that the stepparent exception to the general rule applied
in this case, permitting their petition. The trial court denied the
grandparents’ petition, ruling that the stepparent adoption exception of the
Adoption Code (opposition from a stepparent cannot defeat a petition for
grandparenting time) did not apply in this case because Wright was no longer a
stepparent because Warren had died and Wright had remarried. The term
“stepparent” is not defined in the Adoption Code. In the Court of Appeals, Wright argued that Warren’s death ended his status
as a stepparent, and that to hold otherwise would mean that he would still be a
“stepparent” today, while also being a “parent,” as he adopted the child as his
guardian. The Court of Appeals concluded that the Code contemplates that
situation, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. In its decision, the
Court of Appeals applied the “plain language” rule to the interpretation of the
Code. The rationale behind its ruling was this: the plain language of MCL
722.27b(13) refers to a stepparent adopting a child and thus becoming a
parent via adoption. The statute covers adoption by a stepparent of any
kind under the entire Adoption Code. Because section MCL 722.27b(13) references
the entire Adoption Code, it addressed guardianship adoptions such as occurred
here. Under the grandparent visitation provisions, a stepparent who is widowed by
the death of the child’s natural parent does not stop being a stepparent when he
or she is widowed, adopts the child, or remarries, or when the new spouse adopts
the child. Thus, the step-parent exception applied and the grandparents have
standing to bring the grandparenting action. However, there’s more: MCL 722.27b(5) allows two fit parents to oppose a
grandparenting time petition by filing an affidavit opposing it. MCL 722.1(b)
defines parents as “natural parents, if married prior or subsequent to the
minor’s birth; adopting parents, if the minor has been legally adopted; or the
mother, if the minor is illegitimate.” The Wrights fit within this description.
Thus on remand, the Wrights still have the continued opportunity to oppose the
petition as two fit parents. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for
further proceedings. The case is Warren v Wright, and may be
read in its entirely here. To visit Jeanne Hannah's website
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Technorati tag: grandparent visitation
Mr. Hamden:
Thank you for your interesting commentary on this case. I agree that your additional fact (that the grandfather was the "adopted father of the deceased mother") is interested. I'm not sure what you mean. Do you mean that he was adopted by his parents and then fathered the deceased mother?
In the adoption code, "relative" means "an individual who is related to the child within the fifth degree of consanguinity by marriage, blood, or adoption." MCL 710.22(t)
Also see MCL 710.60(1) and (2) which make it clear that adopted persons acquire status as natural born children of the adoptive parents. It seems logical to me that the Court of Appeals might analyze the case in this manner. Jeanne
Posted by: Jeanne M Hannah | September 23, 2008 at 05:20 PM
I think you summarized the facts and analysis on this case very well. I actually argued the case before the trial court after the remand. The court bifurcated the trial, holding the first phase of the trial on whether their existed a “substantial risk of harm” to the adopted child.
After taking testimony from the “grandparents” on this case, it was determined that there was no risk at all and the court denied any grandparenting time.
A rather interesting issue that did not appear in the court of appeals or the trial court was whether the “grandparent” should be still be considered a grandfather when he was not the biological father of the deceased biological mother. In fact the grandfather attempting to get grandparenting time was only the adopted father of the deceased biological mother. I wonder if the court of appeals would give the same ruling had these facts been given to it?
Dominic N. Hamden
Attorney at Law
Posted by: Dominic N. Hamden | September 23, 2008 at 04:39 PM