At the recent Summer Seminar, one of the published decisions Scott Bassett summarized during his presentation was Megee v Carmine, Docket No. 292207, (For Publication), November 16, 2010. Michigan Court of Appeals. It dealt with the consequences of the husband's post-divorce waiver of retirement pay in favor of collecting combat-related special compensation (CRSC).
The parties' judgment of divorce was entered in September 1989. In the judgment, defendant Carmine [f/k/a Megee] was awarded 50 percent of plaintiff’s Navy disposable retirement pay as part of the property division. The judgment incorporated a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) to enforce that provision. The QDRO acknowledged the 50-percent division of plaintiff’s disposable retirement pay, also referred to therein as his pension, and it prevented plaintiff from making another benefit election “that would otherwise reduce the monthly pension allotment without the written consent [of defendant].”
Do you remember that post I wrote a few weeks ago about how a binding contract might be formed by an exchange of emails between counsel? Would you believe that a letter sent unilaterally by one lawyer to another could form a binding agreement? The Court of Appeals decided an unpublished case on September 23, 2010 in which a settlement agreement was binding on the parties even though there was no mutually exchanged written, signed agreement because there was evidence sufficient to satisfy the requirements of MCR 2.507(G). This wasn't a family law case, but the principles would apply in a family law case.
On March 26th, the court of appeals reversed a trial court's decision to enter a judgment of divorce that included conditions regarding termination that were not included in the settlement placed on the record. This case illustrates how important it is to fully state the parties' agreement on the record in open court and to avoid making assumptions that "what we usually expect" as conditions for termination of alimony will also belong in the judgment.
